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Pursuing the Unity of Science: Ideology and Scientific Practice from 
the Great War to the Cold War, edited by the late Harmke Kamminga 
and Geert Somsen, is a collection of ten essays (with an introduction 
that provides the context), delivers exactly what the title promises: 
an account of the ideology and practice of unified science. With its 
consciously structured case studies, the volume exemplifies nicely the 
theme of the series it is part of, Routledge’s Science, Technology and 
Culture, 1700-1945. 
 
“Unity of Science” or “Unified Science” (“UoS”) meant, and still 
means, various things and, by extension, the same is true of “Disunity 
of Science”. One might think that there is only one genuine science, 
and that all the various disciplines and approaches are just 
historically contingent, even if they seem to be fruitful divisions. The 
general question of what provides the ‘cement’ that does the 
unification (common concepts, laws, methods, entities) is rarely 
asked nowadays – since a major part of contemporary philosophy of 
science has moved towards the actual, micro-level description of 
scientific practice. So one might wonder about what we can learn 
from a volume on unity, given that the whole motivation for the 
project of a unified science is almost entirely off the table. Two things 
must be mentioned here: (1) the process of how these questions were 
buried in the backyard has hitherto rarely been asked, and (2) the 
history of failure may provide some more interesting morals to 
consider. The volume succeeds in both of these tasks. 
 
Philosophy of science, especially where it is concerned with the idea 
of unity, is often entangled with such epistemological and ontological 
questions, as how theory-reduction, translations between 
vocabularies and isomorphic relations between different structures 
are possible and actualized. These questions were asked and pursued, 
for example, by Ernest Nagel, Carl G. Hempel, Herbert Feigl, and to 
some extent W. V. O. Quine – in a nutshell, by logical empiricist 
philosophers of science. Nonetheless, the purely abstract and 
technical matters did no exhaust all possibilities, as the volume nicely 
attests, neither in the logical empiricist camp nor outside of it. One of 
the great merits of the volume are the diverse perspectives on the 
idea that unity of science was always more than just a scientific 
hypothesis requiring experimental or theoretical justification. 
 
What were the reasons then for the various “unity of science 
movements”? As it turns out from the very first chapter onwards, 
“unity of science” had always been entangled with practical reasons 
in the widest sense. Thus, the question emerges: Was there any 
epistemic rationale behind these, and if yes, how did it function and 
was it related to these practical reasons? Instead of going through all 
the chapters individually (which present various case studies and 
much historical information), I will summarize the chief lines of 
argument, the ideal and general patterns behind the approaches 
documented in the book. 
 
One thing that needs to be noted right at the beginning is that “unity 
of science” was mainly an ideological project. Once we accept this 
idea, it becomes a lot easier to understand the ups and downs of UoS 
in the twentieth century: rapid and wide-ranging changes in society, 
politics, culture – and, by extension, in ideology – went hand in hand 
with promoting and/or rejecting the idea that science is united. But 
how is it relevant to social or political concerns that science is one or 
many per se? The answer is not at all settled for now, but one thing 
seems to be sure: In the interwar period, UoS was a scientific and a 
political ideal as well. It claimed that scientific knowledge and the 
various epistemic virtues encoded in scientific practice (such as 
experimentation, intersubjectivity, simplicity, predictive-force, etc.) 
would empower both the individual and the masses. As Fernando 
Salmón and Rafael Huertas show in Chapter 7, during the Spanish 
Civil War, the advocates of modernism and the secular state 
(defenders of the so-called Second Republic), used the idea of unified 
science against the fascist state “as an agent in modernization”. 
 
Thus one might be led to expect that by varying the political and 
cultural contexts, the details and exact aims of UoS would vary as 
well. In Chapter 2, Peter Galison reconstructs that idea. He 
differentiates three phases of the “meanings of scientific unity”: (1) a 
nationalist-metaphysical one (during the second half of the 19th 
century with Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Hermann Helmholtz and Ernst 
Brücke); (2) an internationalist-antimetaphysical one (1918-1939, 
with logical empiricism); and finally (3) a mainly epistemological-
metaphysical one (in the second half of twentieth century, associated 
with the search for the ‘ultimate building blocks of the universe’). As 
Galison claims, “unity has come to mean different things at different 
times at different places – there is a dis-unity to the genealogy of 
unity” (p. 12). 
 
Nonetheless the aforementioned three senses of unity, “nationalist”, 
“internationalist”, and “metaphysical”, form the core around which all 
the other versions that were pursued in different places, times and 
contexts can be organized. Various forms of nationalism (usually 
“national science”) are taken up in Chapter 4 (on Rutherford and his 
Cambridge laboratory), Chapter 5 (which deals with Dutch scientists 
promoting Dutch science and later nationalism in the 1930s), and 
Chapter 8 (Paul Rotha as a documentarian of British reconstruction 
and planning). Though these forms of nationalism cannot be equated 
with the extreme nationalism that haunted Europe (and even beyond) 
after the 1930s, they still point to the fact that unified science in itself 
is not – at least not internally and exclusively – interwoven with 
internationalism. 
 
Nevertheless, internationalist aims (such as world peace, progress, 
global health, world education etc.) provided the main slogans for 
many of the UoS movements. Among the various forms of 
internationalism, one finds humanism (the topic of Chapters 3 and 9), 
socialism (Chapters 5 and 11), the ideal of a world-state (Chapter 6), 
and secularized modernism (Chapter 7). But despite the 
aforementioned nationalistic leanings of Rutherford, Dutch scientists, 
and Rotha, all of them had either an internationalist phase or some 
leanings towards internationalism as well. 
 
As I mentioned above, UoS was mainly an ideology, or had ideological 
motivations (and not, for example, purely first-order “technical” 
reasons). Thus, even if we find professional scientists among its 
advocates, the main job of promoting the idea was done by non-
academics – a fact that still awaits closer analysis. Though the 
defenders of the various UoS approaches were non-academics (or 
scientists who pursued the ideal in non-academic contexts), this does 
not, of course, mean that science did not play a role in the unification 
process. Interestingly, all the efforts documented in the book were 
naturalistic in the sense that unification was based on science itself: 
Its advocates did not consider philosophy to be a “super-science” 
which would unify the sciences in a top-down fashion. It was never 
quite settled, however, which science should take the lead in this 
process: Julian Huxley utilized biology, H. G. Wells developed a 
comprehensive project around the “science of life”, Paul Rotha 
worked with films and thus communication, Spanish scientists 
envisioned the modern secular unity through neuropsychiatry, while 
Otto Neurath framed his International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 
around logic and the social sciences at the same time. 
 
Adding ideology to non-academic scientific popularizing did not 
always end up a resounding success. The majority of practicing 
scientists were not enthusiastic about UoS (see especially Chapters 3, 
6, and 9). They either disliked the idea of combining first-order 
science with any social and/or political concern, or were simply 
disinterested in such a project, since they thought that UoS had 
nothing substantial to add to the content of their research. 
 
Furthermore, there were other reasons as well: Chapters 10 and 11 
describe how the socially and politically engaged philosophy of 
European logical empiricism (and the corresponding ideal of UoS) 
failed in the United States. We get two different perspectives and 
stories: David Hollinger (Chapter 10) claims that there were some 
“aspects of the American scene that Neurath and others of the Vienna 
Circle were slow to comprehend” (p. 217), at least partly due to the 
fact that their idea of scientifically structuring the shape of life and 
consciously producing tools for societal empowerment had already 
been in play there for many decades. On the other hand, George 
Reisch (Chapter 11) describes a story of initial success (evidenced by 
how Neurath, Carnap, and Philipp Frank seamlessly blended into the 
American atmosphere), and its subsequent failure during the Cold 
War (due to the socialist – sometimes overt, sometimes merely tacit – 
tendencies of Neurath’s UoS idea). 
 
Things have changed recently on many fronts: During the second half 
of the twentieth century, once philosophy of science had been 
institutionalized as a theoretically oriented (and, in a sense, 
paradigm-driven) profession, much, if not all, of its socially and 
politically engaged character (of nationalism and internationalism) 
vanished. Thereafter, even where UoS surfaced occasionally (e.g. in 
Hilary Putnam’s and Paul Oppenheim’s famous paper “Unity of 
Science as a Working Hypothesis”), it was viewed only in the context 
of epistemic and theoretical virtues of structural simplicity, 
ontological economy, and empirical description of the structure of the 
world (see Galison’s chapter). Whereas during the interwar period, 
social and moral virtues were firmly attached to these epistemic ones 
(like unified language ensuring inter-national communication, or the 
explication of inter-scientific relations as a way of strengthening 
planning and socio-cultural reconstruction), this neatly constructed 
chain was permanently broken in the Cold War and later disappeared. 
 
The nucleus of an interesting explanation of all of these is hinted at in 
Chapter 4; there Jeff Hughes shows that in Rutherford’s debate with 
the Viennese physicists, “controversy and interlaboratory rivalry, 
rather than conceptual consensus or methodological unity, were the 
drivers for advance” (p. 73). By reconstructing many details from this 
– partly scientific, partly rhetorical – controversy, Hughes notes the 
advantages of leaving behind the UoS ideal. However, one might 
formulate another narrative: the internal progress and practice of 
science are, in fact, nourished by disunity, competition, 
argumentation, skepticism, specialized fragmentation and the pursuit 
of success, while the external popularization, humanization, and 
teaching of science might indeed be promoted by UoS as an 
ideological movement. The latter (and this was exactly the argument 
of Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank, the director of Institute for the 
Unity of Science during the late 1940s) might also be helpful in 
emphasizing the social embeddedness and relevance of science. But 
that is another story, for another day. 
 
One of the editors, Harmke Kamminga passed away in 2013 – the 
present volume, Pursuing the Unity of Science, envisioned by her is an 
excellent example of why the history of philosophy of science might 
matter. Ideology and Scientific Practice (the two core themes of the 
chapters) were entangled, accounting jointly for the motivation, 
driving force, and the success of the Unity of Science movement, as 
well as its failure. Kamminga’s and Somsen’s volume, with its 
important individual contributions, insightful figures, and a 
systematically arranged index, will be a lasting contribution to the 
history of science, philosophy, persons, and institutions in the context 
of unification during the interwar period. 
 
 
Harmke Kamminga and Geert Somsen (eds.) 
Pursuing the Unity of Science: Ideology and Scientific Practice from 
the Great War to the Cold War.  
London and New York: Routledge, 2016 
ISBN: 9780754640356 
xiii +243 pages, Hardcover, GBP110 
 
Adam Tamas Tuboly is a Young Research Fellow at the Institute of 
Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and lecturer at the 
University of Pécs. His research was supported by the ÚNKP-16-4-II. 
“New National Excellence Program of the Ministry of Human 
Capacities” and the MTA BTK Lendület Morals and Science Research 
Group (Grant No. 2017-287). 
 
 
